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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of the Internet has pushed many established companies to explore this 
radically new  distribution channel. Like all market discontinuities, the Internet creates 
opportunities as well as threats - it can be performance-enhancing as readily as it can be 
performance-destroying.  One  industry  where  this  certainly  holds  is  the  newspaper 
industry,  where  several  players  have rushed to  supplement their traditional  channels 
with  an  Internet channel,  in  spite  of a lingering  fear  of cannibalizing  their existing 
business. Making use of event-study methodology, we assess the net impact of setting 
up  an  additional  Internet channel on a firm's  stock market return,  a measure of the 
change  in  expected  future  cash  flows.  We  find  that,  on  average,  Internet  channel 
investments  are  positive  net-present-value  investments:  the  present  value  of  the 
expected cash inflows is greater than the present value of the anticipated cash outflows. 
We  then  identify  firm,  introduction-strategy,  and  marketplace  characteristics  that 
influence the direction and magnitude of the stock-market reaction. More specifically, 
our results indicate that powerful firms with fewer direct channels achieve greater gains 
in  financial  performance  th3.!l  less  powerful  firms  with  a  broader  direct  channel 
offering. In terms of introduction timing, early followers have a competitive advantage 
vis-a-vis  both innovators  and later followers.  We  also find  that firms  which provide 
additional  advertising  support  to  their Internet channel  introduction  achieve  greater 
financial gains. Finally, in terms of marketplace characteristics, firms operating in fast-
growing Internet environments benefit more than players operating in less munificent 
markets. 1. INTRODUCTION 
The  design  and  management  of  marketing  channels  is  a  powerful  weapon  in  an 
increasingly competitive  and  continually shifting battle for consumers.  An  important 
way in which 'companies use this weapon is by adding new channels to existing ones; 
for instance, by  adding a direct channel to an indirect one.  As  Frazier (1999, p.  232) 
recently observed, "the use of multiple channels of distribution is now becoming the 
rule rather than the exception". The most recent and radically new distribution channel 
companies are expanding into is the Internet. Given recent advances in technology, the 
Internet is  rapidly becoming an  important new channel to go  to market in a range of 
businesses - much faster than anyone would have predicted a few years ago. 
As  they  add  Internet  channels  to  their  existing  channels,  companies  hope  to 
increase  their  performance.  However,  while  expansion  into  this  new  channel  may 
increase the  firms'  penetration  level  and  decrease  their  distribution  costs,  increased 
consumer price sensitivity and lowered levels of support in the entrenched channels 
may  become  liabilities.  The  net effect  of these  opposing  forces  is  yet unclear,  as 
reflected in the following quotes: 
"One  aspect  of e-commerce  that  has  yet  to  be  addressed  in  detail  is  the  [  ... ] 
performance of the new medium. [  ... ] The expectations of profitability of Internet 
trading vary greatly, from it being perceived as a more profitable medium to the 
converse." (Booth, Management Accounting, January 2000, p. 21) 
"It is  difficult for executives  at most companies  [  ...  ] to  estimate accurately the 
returns on any  Internet investment they may make."  (Ghosh, Harvard Business 
Review, 1998, p. 126) 
In  spite  of the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  performance  implications  of adding  an 
Internet channel to their channel portfolio, many firms, attracted by the potential access 
to millions of customers and the relatively low costs of setting up  the channel,  have 
rushed to establish an Internet channel. Others, daunted by the fear of a continuing price 
squeeze and/or an  alienation of their entrenched channels,  wait for more evidence to 
accumulate. 
In this context, one of the main conclusions of the eBusiness workshop organized 
by Penn State's eBusiness Research Center is that academic contributions on the subject 
are needed, since "without sound research, eBusiness managers are sailing rudderless" 
(Donath  1999, p.  2).  A similar call for more scholarly research is  raised by Hoffman subsequently present data specifics and variable operationalizations. We then present 
our empirical results, and close with implications for channel management, limitations, 
and future research opportunities. 
2. THE PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING VS. PERFORMANCE-DESTROYING 
CAPACITY OF AN ADDITIONAL INTERNET CHANNEL 
The addition of an  Internet channel poses opportunities as  well as threats - it can be 
performance-enhancing as  readily as  it can be performance-destroying (Kumar 1999). 
Supplementing  existing  channels  with  an  Internet  channel  can  enhance  a  firm's 
expected performance when demand- and/or supply-side advantages are bestowed on 
the firm. A demand-side advantage allows to charge a higher price at a given level of 
demand, or to generate a higher demand at a given price. Supply-side advantages occur 
when  a  lower cost structure  is  incurred.  Adding  an  Internet channel can also  harm 
expected performance, however, through demand- (reduced revenues) and/or supply-
side (increased costs) disadvantages. We elaborate on each of these factors, which are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
--- Insert Figure 1 ---
Demand-side advantages.  Revenue gains  can be obtained through  (1)  demand 
expansion, and/or (2) higher prices. 
(1)  Demand  expansion.  The Internet can increase sales  in  three ways:  market 
expansion, brand switching, and relationship deepening. Market expansion occurs when 
new  (segments of)  customers are reached who  did not yet buy in the category. Estee 
Lauder, for example, hopes that Clinique.com will attract customers who avoid buying 
at a cosmetics counter because they find the experience intimidating (Machlis 1998b). 
Demand may also expand through brand switching, i.e.  by  winning customers from 
competitors.  After  having  received numerous  e-mails  from  customers eager to  buy 
direct, Estee Lauder launched its Internet channel, fearing that by failing to do so, its 
competitors would be able to attract its less loyal customers. One specific way in which 
new segments can be tapped or customers won from competitors is through expansion 
of the current market to the global market (Quelch and Klein  1996). Finally, demand 
may  expand through relationship deepening,  i.e.  selling more to existing customers. 
Barnes and Noble Inc.,  for  example,  saw record sales  in  its  real-world  stores upon 
launching its online store, as this increased their customers' interest in books (Machlis 
3 commission costs),  and dealing directly with  their customers (Benjamin and Wigand 
1995).  Airlines,  e.g.,  are making headway  selling tickets  online because their direct 
sales  model  eliminates the commission paid  to  travel  agents  (Gilbert and Bacheldor 
2000). 
Demand-side disadvantages.  On  the demand-side,  disadvantages can  occur for 
two reasons: (1) demand reduction, and (2) lower prices. 
(1)  Demand  reduction.  Adding  an  Internet  channel  to  an  entrenched  channel 
system may involve channel 'shift' - customers moving from one channel to another -
without channel  'lift' - new sales (Alba et al.  1997). Adding an  Internet channel may 
even lead to a decrease in total sales when consumers buy less through the new channel 
than through their old channel, e.g. when there are less impulse purchases through the 
Internet (Machlis  1998b),  or when  disenchanted distributors offer less support to  the 
firm's products, resulting in more brand switching towards the competitors. 
(2)  Lower prices.  For many firms,  a major threat posed by the Internet is  that 
profits could be  eroded through the intensified price competition that might ensue as 
consumers' .  search costs are lowered (Alba et al.  1997; Lynch and Ariely 2000). The 
Internet  increases  the  power  of the  consumer,  compared  to  traditional  channels  of 
distribution,. as price comparison across suppliers can be performed quickly and easily. 
As  a consequence, prices and margins  are  expected to be pushed down  (Daniel  and 
Storey 1997; see also Degeratu et al. 2000). 
Supply-side disadvantages.  On the cost side of the equation, expanding into an 
Internet channel may increase physical-distribution costs as well as transaction costs. 
(1)  Higher physical-distribution costs.  The  cost of an  Internet channel has  two 
components:  fixed  start-up  costs,  such  as  the  purchase  of computer  hardware  and 
software,  and  the  costs  of  Internet  hosting  services.  Also,  higher  advertising 
expenditures may  be  needed to  create awareness  for  the  new  channel.  Even  though 
Internet  channels  can  vary  dramatically  in  cost,  some  incremental  expenditures  are 
always involved. 
(2)  Higher  transaction  costs.  Existing  channels  may  view  the  new  Internet 
channel as unwelcome competition. They may fear their sales volume will be reduced if 
firms  reach  out  directly  to  their  consumers.  In  addition,  the  very  low  physical-
distribution costs  and  easily obtainable economies  of scale  of Internet channels may 
5 performance is  enhanced or destroyed  is  contingent upon  a  number of factors.  The 
marketing strategy literature suggests that the performance of a new entry depends on 
firm/product  characteristics,  the  introduction  strategy,  and  the  marketplace  or 
environment (Gatignon et al.  1990). We develop specific hypotheses for each of these 
three categories (see Figure 2 for a schematic representation). 
--- Insert Figure 2 ---
Firm characteristics 
Firms are distinctive because they have accumulated different physical and intangible 
assets, such as capital equipment, financial reserves, employee skills, brand equity, and 
marketing expertise. These firm-specific  resources and capabilities may influence the 
effectiveness of the firm's new channel introduction (Day 1994; Mata et al.  1995). We 
consider three specific dimensions of a firm's resources  and capabilities:  its  channel 
power, direct-channel experience, and size, and formulate hypotheses on how these may 
moderate the performance implications of an Internet channel addition. 
Channel power 
Power is a crucial concept in marketing channels research. Channels researchers have 
often  derived  their  definitions  of power  from  Emersori's  (1962)  power-dependence 
theory:  a firm's  power over a  distributor is  determined by the latter's  motivational 
investment  in  the  relationship,  and  his/her  availability  of alternatives.  Motivational 
investment refers to the value of the resources or outcomes mediated by the firm,  and 
has often been operationalized via the 'sales and profits' approach: the greater the sales 
and  profits  a  firm  accounts  for,  the  greater  its  power  (Frazier  et  al.  1989).  The 
availability-of-alternatives component refers to the difficulty of replacing the outcomes 
mediated by the firm because of the lack of alternative partners: the lower the number 
of available  alternatives,  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  replace  the  sales  and  profits 
accounted  for  by  the  firm,  and  the  greater  the  firm's  power  over  the  distributor 
(Buchanan 1992). 
When  a firm establishes an  Internet channel, this  is likely to  lead to a loss  of 
goodwill on the part of the established channels, regardless of whether the firm is low 
or high  in channel power.  However, whether or not the entrenched channel will  act 
upon this loss of goodwill depends on channel power. When a firm has little channel 
power, opportunistic behavior may arise on the part of distributors to take advantage of 
unspecified  or  unenforceable  elements  within  the  relationship  (Anderson  1988), 
7 conversion  to  direct channels  only (Dutta et al.  1995).  In response,  distributors may 
provide lower levels of support for the firm's products, pushing competitors' products 
instead (Frazier 1999). This may cause some of the firm's customers to switch to one of 
these competitors. 
When  we  total  up  these  effects,  our  net  prediction  is  that  direct-channel 
experience  is  negatively  related  to  the  performance  implications  of  an  additional 
Internet channel: 
H2:  The performance implications of an  additional Internet channel are  negatively 
related to direct-channel experience. 
Firm size 
On the demand-side, small firms typically have more to gain from an Internet channel 
addition  than  large  firms  (Alba  et  al.  1997).  As  the  Internet  greatly  extends  the 
geographical reach of small companies, it allows them to secure new customers from 
around  the  world  in  ways  formerly  restricted  to  much  larger  firms  (OECD  1999). 
Therefore,  the  smaller the firm,  the  more it can benefit from  the  geographic market 
expansion and brand-switching opportunities offered by an additional Internet channel. 
In contrast, large firms may be better able to command a higher price/margin. In order 
to feel more secure when dealing over the Internet, consumers may be willing to pay a 
price premium to purchase a product from a large, well-known firm,  as  its reputation 
may  signal  reliability  of delivery,  security  of information,  dependability  of return 
policy, etc. (Smith et al. 1999). 
On the supply-side, one could argue that large firms can enjoy economies of scale. 
The larger the firm, the more efficiently it can fulfill  marketing functions in  general, 
and distribution functions in particular, and therefore the lower its physical-distribution 
costs (Anderson 1985). However, in  the context of market discontinuities such as  the 
introduction of Internet channels, costly investments and general  marketing expertise 
built  up  over the  years  may  become  useless,  and  new  skills  and  assets  need  to  be 
acquired (Chandy and Tellis 1998; Mitchell  1989). For example, the software systems 
that  serve  as  the  basis  for  Internet  channels  require  new,  specialized  expertise  to 
develop  and  operate  (Mata  et  al.  1995).  As  a  result,  the  superior  resources  and 
capabilities  of  larger  organizations  may  no  longer  give  them  the  same  physical-
distribution cost advantages as in the old economy. 
9 On the pricing dimension, early movers may be able to earn a higher price/margin 
if switching costs to competing products and channels are sufficiently high.  Switching 
costs  are  created when  customers  make  investments that are  specific  to  a particular 
firm,  such  as  the  time  and  effort  they  have  spent  in  learning  the  firm's  channel 
interface. As time elapses and the number of players in the market increases, it becomes 
more difficult to enjoy this kind of price premium (Smith et al.  1999). 
Also  on  the  supply-side,  early  entry  may  have  positive  effects  on  physical-
distribution  costs.  Even  though  we  do  not  expect  major  experience-curve  effects 
because of the rapid diffusion rate of the new technology (cf.  supra),  marketing cost 
advantages  may  well  accrue  to  early  movers.  Later  entrants  may  require  more 
marketing  support  (more  extensive  advertising  andlor  economic  inducements)  to 
overcome the barriers-of-entry erected by earlier firms in terms of consumer awareness 
and preference (Kerin et al.  1992). 
Other researchers  have  advocated  early  imitation  as  a profitable  alternative  to 
moving  first  (see  e.g.  Lee  et  al.  2000;  Teece  1986).  Specifically,  technological 
discontinuities may  create physical-distribution-cost advantages to later entrants (Yip 
1982).  When  superior  technologies  are  expected  to  become  available,  it  may  be 
beneficial to postpone the Internet channel introduction, and to immediately incorporate 
the  new  technologies  once they  become  available.  This may enable later entrants to 
leapfrog early movers if they stay committed to the older technologies (Dos Santos and 
Peffers 1995). Also, early firms may make costly mistakes, as  there is  little precedent 
from which to learn about the idiosyncrasies of the new channel. In contrast, firms that 
wait until some competitors have made the move can learn from the latter's experience 
and do better at a lower cost (Kerin et al.  1992). 
In conclusion, the above argumentation suggests that it may be beneficial to wait 
and learn from the first mover's experience, while still being fast enough to exploit the 
various demand advantages related to early entry. As such, early followers may reap the 
greatest benefits and outperform both pioneers and late movers (see Golder and Tellis 
(1993)  for  a  similar  argumentation).  To  capture  this  potentially  non-monotonic 
relationship  between  order  of entry  and  performance,  the  following  hypothesis  is 
proposed: 
H3:  The relationship between the financial performance implications of an  Internet 
channel addition and order of entry takes the form of an inverted U. 
11 their channel  system to  satisfy various  growing consumer segments.  This  combined 
effort  may  cause  further  market  expansion  (cf.  Bayus  and  Putsis  1999).  Second, 
because of the existence of some untapped demand or need, munificent markets may 
provide  both  existing  channels  and  the  new  Internet  channel  with  sales  and  profit 
opportunities (Dwyer and  Oh  1987), making cannibalization less likely as  they don't 
have  to  engage  in  a  zero-sum  game.  Third,  in  growth  markets,  consumers'  price 
sensitivity tends to be lower (Aaker and Day 1986). 
The supply-side mechanism for the effect of product demand pivots on channel 
conflict  and  the  corresponding  transaction  costs  (Pfeffer  and  Salancik  1978). 
Specifically,  "channels  in  declining  markets  [are]  often  associated  with  intense 
interchannel  rivalry"  (Dwyer  and  Oh  1987,  p.  348).  In  contrast,  in  rapidly  growing 
markets,  the  intensity  of friction  and  perceived  conflict  between  the  firm  and  its 
entrenched  channels  decrease,  because  losses  in  share  need  not  reduce  the  latter's 
absolute sales levels. As a net result, we offer the following hypothesis: 
Hs:  The  performance  implications  of an  Internet  channel  addition  are  positively 
related to product demand. 
Channel demand 
Many  scholars  have  employed  a  demand-pull  perspective  towards  innovation  and 
change. In this view, the adoption of an important organizational innovation such as the 
addition of an Internet channel is  driven by its revenue-generating potential,  which is 
likely to  increase as  the Internet community grows (Peterson et al.  1997). This growth 
may  come  from  both  new  customers  to  the  category,  or involve  a  switching  from 
traditional channels (company- or competitor-owned). 
As for the prices charged, Zettelrneyer (2000) has recently shown analytically that 
the prices firms set depend on the reach of the Internet. If  the Internet is  'small', firms 
do  not  find  it worthwhile to retaliate when  they detect competitive price discounting 
over the  Internet.  As  a consequence,  average prices  on  the Internet are  likely to  be 
lower than in the conventional channel. However, as  the Internet 'grows', competitive 
price cuts over the Internet may hurt a firm more, and retaliation becomes more likely. 
As firms realize that a spiral of retaliation may end in an aggressive price war, they tend 
to  refrain  from  competitive  price  discounting  over  the  Internet.  Therefore,  as  the 
13 market reaction, in contrast, compares investment costs to the expected revenues. 
Second, Internet channels are such a new phenomenon that they provide a risky 
and  uncertain setting (Hoffman  and Novak  1996).  In demonstrating the performance 
implications of an additional Internet channel, the uncertainty of the outcomes (the risk 
factor)  should  be taken  into  account,  which  is  not  done  in  traditional  performance 
indicators. In contrast, investors' evaluation of the proposed project takes into account 
the potential risks associated with the expected cash flows. 
Third,  end-of-the-year accounting numbers  may be  influenced by a number of 
factors that took place during the year, of which the Internet channel introduction is just 
one. The event study methodology advocated in this study (cf.  infra) allows measuring 
the  impact  of a  specific  event  type  on  daily  (i.e.,  temporally  dis aggregated)  stock 
returns. 
To  further  complicate  the  picture,  several  of the  benefits  of the  Internet  are 
intangible, such as  opening a market, keeping a window of opportunity, or blocking a 
competitor  (OECD  1999).  Conversely,  Internet  channel  projects  may  also  include 
'hidden'  costs  that  devalue  intangible  assets.  For example,  intrachannel competition 
may  lead  to  soured  relationships  with  existing  distribution  channels  and  damage 
channel  equity  (Kumar  1999).  Such intangible  or hidden  benefits  and  costs  do  not 
appear on the balance sheet, and are therefore not reflected in  traditional performance 
indicators. 
Cash  flows,  in  contrast,  are  increasingly  viewed  as  less  susceptible  to  the 
aforementioned problems (Day and Fahey 1988; Srivastava et al.  1998). According to 
financial  theory,  a  company's  stock  price  reflects  the  market's  expectations  of the 
discounted value of all  future  cash flows  expected to  accrue to  the firm  (Rappaport 
1987).  Market efficiency implies  that the  stock price accurately reflects all available 
information (including information on  long-term, uncertain, and intangible outcomes) 
relating to the performance of the firm.  As  new information becomes public, investors 
update  their expectations about long-term future  cash flows,  reacting immediately by 
buying or selling stock. As such, information resulting in  a positive (negative) change 
in expected future cash flows will have a positive (negative) effect on stock price. The 
release of information, or event, we investigate in this study is the announcement of an 
Internet channel addition. 
15 N 
(4)  e,  = Le;, /  N 
i=l 
where N is  the number of announcements being studied. To  test whether the  average 
abnonnal  return is  different from  0 on the  event day t =  0 (which falls  on  different 
calendar days for different announcements), we use the test statistic which is distributed 
unit nonnal for large N: 
N 
(5)  20 = Lew /.IN 
i=1 
where  CiQ  is eiolSi,  and Si is  the standard deviation of the regression residuals that were 
obtained prior to  the event announcement.  This  test statistic allows  us  to  detennine 
whether, on average, investors perceive the potential perfonnance-enhancing factors to 
outweigh the corresponding perfonnance-destroying factors. 
Thus far,  we  considered the ideal situation that there is no  infonnation leakage 
prior to the event day,  and that all infonnation is  completely disseminated during the 
event day.  In  practice,  these  assumptions  may  be  violated  (McWilliams  and  Siegel 
1997).  As  soon  as  infonnation  leaks  (e.g.,  a newspaper  article  speculating  about  a 
potential Internet channel introduction prior to  the  official  announcement), the  event 
period should include one or more days prior to the announcement of the event so that 
abnonnal returns associated with the leakage are also captured. In a similar vein, when 
infonnation becomes only gradually available to the broad public, an allowance should 
be  made  for  dissemination  effects  on  the  days  following  the  announcement.  When 
leakage (for  tJ  periods  before the  event) and/or dissemination over time  (for  t2  time 
periods  after  the  event)  occur,  one  can use  a  similar test  statistic  as  in  Eq.  (5)  to 
compute the significance of the average abnonnal return on  these days.  One can also 
aggregate  the  abnonnal  returns  over  the  'event  period'  [-tlh]  into  a  cumulative 
abnonnal return (CAR) in order to draw overall inferences for the event of interest: 
t=-11 
Because the event study is  conducted over multiple events, this  CAR can be averaged 
across events into a cumulative average abnonnal return (CAAR): 
N 
(7)  CAAR[-t J ,t2 ] = L  CAR; [-tJ , t2 ]/ N 
i=l 
17 will correct for the general over-valuation that might affect this type of firms,  if this 
would indeed be the case. 
S.DATA 
Sample and data-collection procedure 
Our  empirical  application  is  situated  in  the  newspaper  industry,  which  offers  an 
interesting setting to apply our framework to. First, it represents a mature, old-economy 
industry that faces rising costs,  falling revenues,  and  increasing retail power (Molina 
1997; Nicholas et al.  1996). As a result, many publishers have taken a closer look at the 
opportunities  offered  by  direct  distribution,  and  wonder  whether  the  Internet  may 
become a profitable option. 
While they share the above characteristics with many other industries, newspapers 
have  the  natural  advantage  that  they  can  be  'delivered'  online  fairly  easily.  As  a 
consequence,  publishers  have  taken  the  lead  in  exploiting  the  Internet  as  a  new 
distribution channel. By the end of 1999, over 2,700 newspaper around the world had 
online  businesses  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  1998).  As  such,  the  publishing 
industry  tends  to  "act  as  the  pacesetter  for  the  Information  Society"  (European 
Commission  1996,  p.  1),  and  is  expected to  foreshadow  trends that will  occur more 
slowly in other industries. 
In addition, newspaper executives are confronted with many of the performance-
enhancing and -destroying forces  identified before, leading them to  call the Internet 
both their prime concern  and  their most  promising source  of new  revenues  (Casale 
2000). On the supply-side, newspaper executives do not yet have enough experience to 
draw firm conclusions on  eventual cost structures.  On  the one hand,  online  editions 
require a lower capital investment, and the marginal cost of distributing extra copies is 
almost  negligible.  Other  sources  argue  that  costs  may  simply  shift  from  physical 
printing  and  distribution  to  acquiring  and  maintaining  technology,  while  incurring 
higher marketing costs  (U.S.  Department of Commerce  1998).  Apart from  physical-
distribution-cost effects, there is also uncertainty with respect to the transaction costs 
involved. Some experts argue that online newspapers will not replace the print version. 
Others fear that their retail distributors may interpret it as a declaration of war (Noack 
1993). 
19 announcement  may  actually  occur prior  to  the  date  of the  actual  Internet  channel 
introduction. For the majority of newspapers, they turned out to be the same, and in our 
subsequent analyses, no  significant impact was  found  when controlling for this joint 
occurrence. 
Operationalization of  measures 
Financial measures.  Daily stock prices of the firms  included in our sample and 
daily market indices of the Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London, and Paris Stock Exchanges 
(Le., AEX-24, DAX-30, FTSE-lOO, and CAC-40) were obtained from the Datastream 
database. These data were used to calculate, respectively, the firms' daily returns Rir, i.e. 
the percent change in stock price, and the market returns Rmt• 
Channel  power.  Following  Emerson  (1962),  we  include  a  measure  for  both 
motivational investment and availability of alternatives to capture channel power. The 
former is measured as  the percentage of sales the newspaper accounts for in the total 
sales of a representative distributor in a specific sales region (median =  4%, range = 
0.1%-55%). Availability of alternatives was measured through the number of titles a 
representative  distributor  in  a  specific  sales  region  can  use  to  replace  the  sales 
accounted for by the focal newspaper (median =  3, range =  1-19). Since the power of a 
supplier over a distributor is (1) directly proportional to  the supplier's contribution to 
the  distributor's  sales,  and  (2)  inversely  proportional  to  the  number  of alternatives 
available to the distributor, channel power is measured by the ratio of contribution-to-
sales to number-of-alternatives, after standardization of both measures. Data on sales, 
sales regions, and number of alternative titles were obtained from local branches of the 
International Federation of Audit Bureaus of Circulations (IF  ABC). 
Direct channel experience.  Direct channel experience is operationalized as  the 
number of direct channels established by the firm prior to the current Internet channel 
addition (median =  3, range =  1-18).7 
Firm  size.  We compiled  three  measures  of firm  size  from  Wright  Investor's 
Service: number of employees (median =  6,477, range = 400-19,986), sales (median = 
€ 700 million, range = € 56 million-4,539 million), and the market value of the firm 
(median = €  2,466  million,  range  =  €  76  million-38,550  million).  All  three  are 
commonly  used  measures  of  firm  size  (see,  e.g.,  Reddy  et  al.  1994).  After 
standardization,  the  three  items  were  averaged  into  a  single  scale  of  firm  size. 
21 surrounding the event day, the one from 0 to +1  shows the most significant CAAR, with 
a value of .98%. This positive value is driven by two factors: positive evaluations occur 
more frequently (61 % of cases on the event day t =  0, and 65% of the cases on t =  + 1), 
and they are, on average, larger than the negative ones (the average positive CAAR over 
the event window [0,+1] is 1.95%, versus an average negative CAAR value of -1.22%). 
Our  estimate  on  the  size  of  the  stock-market  reaction  to  Internet  channel 
announcements has the same order of magnitude as CAARs reported in other marketing-
related  event  studies.  Horsky  and  Swyngedouw  (1987),  for  example,  report  a 
CAAR[O,O] of .61 % for company name changes, while Chaney et al. (1991) and Chaney 
and Devinney (1992)  find  a  CAAR[-l,+l]  of,  respectively,  .75%  and .60%  for new 
product announcements. In the context of celebrity endorsement contracts, Agrawal and 
Kamakura (1995) report a  CAAR[-l,O] of .54%, while Hendricks  and Singhal (1997) 
find  a  CAAR[O,O]  of .50%  for  the  receipt of quality  awards.  Finally,  Houston  and 
Johnson (2000)  report  CAARs[-l,O]  ranging from .20%  to 4.56% for buyer-supplier 
contracts and joint ventures. 
Apart from the statistical significance of the CAAR-values obtained, one may want 
to consider their practical or economic significance. To that extent,  we calculated the 
average change in  the market value of a median-sized firm in our sample.lO  A  .98% 
cumulative abnormal return for such a company with a market value of € 2.5 billion 
results in an increase in market value (adjusted for overall market movements) of€ 24.5 
million in two days. 
In spite of this statistical and economic significance, questions remain as to  (1) 
whether this positive evaluation is just a temporary reaction that is quickly corrected 
afterwards,  and  (2)  to  what  extent  it  is  merely  an  artifact  of the  general  hype 
surrounding high-tech and e-related stocks. In terms of the first issue, we found that the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (see Figure 3) stabilized at a higher level after the 
event, indicating that the positive evaluation is not just a short-term lift that evaporates 
in the days following the announcement. Put differently, investors continued to evaluate 
the announcement as positive news on average. 
--- Insert Table 2 & Figure 3 ---
In response to the second issue, we used four alternative benchmark portfolios to 
determine the market and abnormal returns: (1) a market portfolio of stocks (reported in 
Table 2), which is the daily market index of the exchange the stock is trading on, (2) a 
23 Internet channel are not significantly affected by product demand (Hs; p > .10), we find 
that they increase with higher channel demand (b = .027, p < .05). 
Hence,  powerful  firms  with  fewer  direct  channels  achieve  greater  gains  in 
financial performance than less powerful firms with a broader direct channel offering. 
Small  firms,  however,  should  not  recoil  from  adding  an  Internet  channel  to  their 
entrenched channels;  firms  of any  size can  successfully play the game.  In  terms  of 
introduction strategy, early followers  have an  advantage vis-a-vis both innovators and 
later followers. We also find that firms that provide advertising support to their Internet-
channel introduction achieve greater gains. In terms of the marketplace characteristics, 
we  find  that firms  operating in fast-growing Internet environments benefit more than 
players operating in less munificent markets. 
We validated these results in two ways.  First, we  again estimated Eq.  (8)  using 
four alternative CARs as dependent variable: based on (1) a standard portfolio of stocks 
(reported in Table 3), (2) a very broad portfolio of stocks, (3) a portfolio consisting of 
printing  and  publishing  companies,  and  (4)  a  portfolio  consisting  of information 
technology companies (cf. supra). With one exception (the coefficient for advertising 
support  becomes  insignificant  when  using  the  portfolio  of printing  and  publishing 
stocks), all re.sults remain substantively the same. We therefore conclude that our results 
are robust to the choice of market portfolio. 
Second, even though none of the country dummy variables was significant (see 
footnote  13),  these  only  allowed  for  an  intercept  difference  across  the  different 
countries. To further assess the appropriateness of pooling the data, we split the sample 
in two subsamples: U.K.- based Internet additions (nl =  57) versus non-U.K. entries (n2 
= 27).  In  all  instances, the equality of the  individual parameters across both samples 
could not be rejected (p > .10). 
Using the estimated model to support decision making 
Our model  can  help managers  make  'go/no-go'  Internet-channel  decisions, and help 
them deal  with  several  trade-offs  inherent  in  introduction-strategy  decisions.  As  an 
illustration, consider two firms. Firm A operates under the worst possible combination 
of circumstances: it has already established 11  direct channels, has little channel power 
(e.g., 1  % contribution to the sales of a representative distributor, who has 7 alternatives 
available), and it operates in a less munificent Internet market (21.7% growth in number 
25 deleterious effects of an  additional Internet channel, as  reflected in  the fact that over 
30%  of  the  cases  result  in  negative  stock  returns.  Therefore,  it  is  imperative  for 
management  to  have knowledge  on  what  drives  the  success of an  Internet channel-
addition strategy. It would thereby be particularly useful if factors currently under the 
firm's control tum out to be pivotal. 
Major findings  - and  guidelines  for  finns  on  whether  and  when  they  should 
consider expanding their distribution network to the Internet - are the following: 
(1) Do powerful firms fare better when setting up an additional Internet channel? 
Powerful  finns  can  get  away  with  far  more  when  supplementing  their  entrenched 
channel system with  an  Internet channel. Although any firm that sets up  an  Internet 
channel should expect to loose at least some of the goodwill of its entrenched channels, 
powerful firms can use their market clout to ensure that their other distributors live up 
to their agreements. 
(2) Does more direct channel experience offer an advantage? Marketers generally 
view prior experience as an important driver for the success of new entries. In contrast 
to this view, we find that established finns which already have other direct channels, get 
financially hurt when adding a new Internet channel to their entrenched channel system. 
This supports our contention that adding yet another Internet channel is not likely to 
bring along substantial new category demand,  but instead may cause cannibalization. 
Moreover, it leads companies to increasingly compete against their indirect distributors. 
This, in tum, is likely to result in the assorted unpleasantries of brand-damaging intra-
channel conflict. 
(3) Is size an important driver of  Internet channel success? Small firms should not 
recoil from adding an Internet channel to their entrenched channel system: finns of any 
size  can  successfully  enter  the  playing  field.  Apparently,  the  geographical  demand 
expansion opportunities flowing disproportionately to smaller firms compensate for the 
price  premium  larger  finns  may  enjoy.  In  addition,  the  superior  resources  and 
management  skills  of large firms  appear to  no  longer give  them the same physical-
distribution cost advantages as in the old economy. 
(4) Should firms strive to be first when adopting an Internet channel? Our results 
indicate  that  finns  should  indeed  be  fast.  However,  we  also  find  that  it  may  be 
beneficial to  let a few  other players enter first.  While firms  should be fast enough to 
exploit various demand-side advantages, there is value in letting others experiment with 
27 measures of channel power,  we  searched for externally  observable proxies.  Also the 
nonavailability of more precise data on advertising support is a drawback of our study. 
Ideally, advertising support is measured as the budgetary support that existed at the time 
the Internet channel is announced. However, in view of the time that has elapsed since 
many of the Internet additions studied here, it was not possible to obtain precise data ex 
post. In spite of these limitations, the results clearly uncovered significant relationships. 
Since the  operationalizations  of channel power and advertising support relate in the 
manner predicted by theory to the cumulative abnormal returns, construct validity is, at 
least partially, supported (Peter 1981). 
Third,  the empirical results reflect Internet channel  announcements in  only one 
industry  within  a European  setting.  Because of potential  idiosyncratic  industry- and 
country-related properties  of our data,  the  generalizability of the results needs to  be 
assessed. Testing the hypotheses with data from multiple industries would necessitate a 
further expansion of the model to recognize sources of variation across industries. 
Fourth,  we  consider  the  performance  implications  of  Internet-channel 
announcements  at  and  around  the  time  of the  announcement.  However,  intended 
strategies may be modified during implementation, and also post-entry implementation 
decisions will clearly determine the ultimate success of the new channel. It would be 
helpful  for  future  researchers  to  track  a  set of announced  decisions,  determine  the 
outcome  of those  decisions,  and  attempt to assess  when  and  by  how  much  market 
valuation  changed  in  response  to  the  aforementioned  modifications  and  post-entry 
actions. Such research would measure the effectiveness of strategy formulation as well 
as implementation. This issue certainly warrants further study. 
In  sum, evidence is  accumulating that the Internet is here to  stay, and that it is 
rapidly evolving into a real  commercial medium. The challenge is  to  get beyond the 
hype,  and to examine the Internet as  a viable distribution channel - one with unique 
capabilities but also with limitations. 
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Time (in days) Table 2.  Abnormal returns for Internet channel additions 
Event Day  Average Abnormal  Z-statistic 
% of  Positive 
Return (%)  Abnormal Returnsa 
-5  -.11  -1.10  46 
-4  -.08  -.48  47 
-3  -.12  -1.00  39 
-2  .13  -.03  41 
-1  -.29  -1.78  44 
0  .57'  4.64  61 
+1  .41'  3.67  65 
+2  -.12  -1.20  41 
+3  -.19  -1.35  42 
+4  -.07  -.69  36 
+5  -.01  1.09  47 
a This column  presents the percentage of the 84 abnormal returns which are positive for 
each day. For example, 61 % of all cases had a positive abnormal return on the event 
day. 
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